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The Duties of Non-Judicial Actors in Ensuring 
Competent Negotiation 
Stephanos Bibas* 
I am delighted that Professor Wes Oliver and the Duquesne 
University School of Law are hosting this timely and important 
symposium on plea-bargaining after Lafler1 and Frye2 and this 
panel on what it takes to make defense counsel effective negotia-
tors.  Those decisions have provoked a long-overdue conversation 
about what kind of defense lawyering is effective and constitu-
tionally required in a world of guilty pleas.  Though the Court rec-
ognized decades ago, in Hill v. Lockhart,3 that ineffective assis-
tance could taint guilty pleas, it is only now working through what 
that principle must mean and how to implement it in practice.   
Lafler and Frye are gratifying in multiple ways.  They are sym-
bolically important and can help to educate the bar and change its 
culture.  The central message is that, pace Judge Easterbrook,4 
one cannot blindly trust that the parties will plea bargain well in 
the shadow of expected trial outcomes.  The market for pleas does 
not function well enough to ensure that plea-bargained outcomes 
track closely expected trial outcomes, the need to inflict retribu-
tion or deter or incapacitate, or similar merits considerations.5  
One of the most important contributing factors to poor plea bar-
gaining is that defense attorneys are often inexperienced, inept, 
underfunded, or overworked.6  But another is that the standards 
for effective assistance of counsel, which are already lax, have 
been focused almost exclusively on mistakes at trial or in prepar-
  
 * Professor of Law and Criminology, University of Pennsylvania.  This is an edited 
transcript of my remarks to a symposium entitled Plea Bargaining After Lafler and Frye, 
held at the Duquesne University School of Law on March 1, 2013.  Thanks to Professor 
Wesley Oliver for organizing this terrific event. 
 1. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012). 
 2. Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399 (2012). 
 3. 474 U.S. 52 (1985). 
 4. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Compromise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 
1975 (1992); Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 289, 309-17 (1983). 
 5. Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 
2463 (2004). 
 6. Id. at 2476-86. 
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ing for trial.  One cannot trust trial-focused ineffective-assistance-
of-counsel doctrine to guard against plea-bargaining errors.   
I agree with Professor Alschuler’s prediction at this symposium 
that courts are going to overturn few convictions ex post.7  Courts 
will not be throwing the jailhouse doors open.  But that metric of 
its impact is going to vastly understate the effect of the decisions.  
The long-term effect of Lafler and Frye on the system will be ex 
ante.  The situation is analogous to the problem of wrongful con-
victions.  DNA evidence is present in only a sliver of cases, so if 
one focuses on exonerations ex post that implicate false confes-
sions or flawed eyewitness identifications, one misses the bigger 
picture.  Nevertheless, those wrongful convictions shine a spot-
light that is starting to fuel innocence commissions and reform 
movements.  These reformers have explored ways to prevent and 
police the causes of wrongful convictions by making a record up 
front, by taping the interrogation or the like, to prevent these mis-
takes from happening in the first place.  Similarly, Lafler and Frye 
will drive changes in the pre-conviction plea-bargaining process.   
Even if one agrees with Professor Alschuler that plea bargain-
ing is regrettable, it is not going away any time soon.  So, if we are 
going to focus on preventing the worst bargaining errors, what can 
we do (in his words) “to make this less awful?”  The ideal approach 
would be to increase greatly the funding and quality of defense 
counsel.  But that is, unfortunately, not going to occur.  Reformers 
have been calling for increased funding for decades, but no chang-
es in support for those programs have occurred.  What can we do 
in a world of scarce, limited resources within a strapped and 
strained system?  Let us also take off the table wholesale decrimi-
nalization of drug cases, for instance, to reduce caseloads.  I want 
to work within the roughly realistic world of changes that are pos-
sible right now.   
Realistically, ineffective-assistance review by judges ex post is 
no panacea.  Ex post review based on a scant guilty-plea record is 
not going to catch many errors.  But, there are a lot of things that 
other actors in the criminal justice system can do to backstop the 
performance of defense counsel and thus to prevent and catch er-
rors, at least the most obvious of them.  Again, Lafler and Frye 
cannot give every defendant a great lawyer or compensate fully for 
gradations in ability among counsel, some of whom will be better 
  
 7. Albert W. Alschuler, Lafler and Frye: Two Small Band-Aids for a Festering Wound, 
51 DUQ. L. REV. 673 (2013). 
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bargainers than others.  The courts will never overturn convic-
tions or sentences simply because a defendant’s bargainer is 
slightly worse than another.  But, in cases like Frye where the 
lawyer entirely fails to pass along a plea offer, or Lafler, where the 
lawyer gave grossly inept advice, I think there are ways to catch 
the worst of those errors, just as health-care professionals catch 
medical errors.   
One of the themes I want to lay out here is that there is much 
that lawyers can learn from what transpires in the medical field.  
Evidence-based medicine is far more advanced than evidence-
based law.  Managed care in medicine is more developed than 
managed care in law.  The ability of organizations to create quali-
ty control and procedures designed to catch the most obvious re-
curring medical errors is much further advanced in the health-
care field than in law.  Simply by borrowing some ideas developed 
in those areas of health care, the legal system can at least rein in 
some of the worst legal errors.  So, let us consider different partic-
ipants in the legal system apart from judges on habeas review.   
First, we need to broaden our understanding of what public de-
fender organizations can do.  I have argued elsewhere that with 
limited defendant resources, governments get the most bang for 
the buck if they concentrate their funding in public defender or-
ganizations, as opposed to ad hoc appointments of people who 
have not accumulated subject-matter expertise.8  Jurisdictions 
that do not already have them could move towards more use of 
public defenders.  I think that internally, public-defender organi-
zations could do much more supervision and training of attorneys.  
We never think about offering clients second opinions.  Before ma-
jor surgery, health-care providers will pay for a second opinion.  I 
think that before a defendant takes a major felony plea, it would 
not cost much to have a brief consultation with a second lawyer 
just to make sure that it is not just one idiosyncratic viewpoint 
that is leading the accused to go under the legal knife, so to speak.   
I also think that we could learn from the way that doctors treat 
medical errors and the way that the FAA treats near misses in 
airline crashes.  What role might there be for retrospective review 
of legal errors?  Of complaints?  Of problems?  What about creat-
ing feedback loops, to learn systemically about what is falling 
through the cracks in a public defender organization, for instance?  
A lawyer may make a mistake once, but such a system would re-
  
 8. Bibas, supra note 5, at 2539-40. 
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duce the chance of repeating the error if supervisors studied the 
first error and used a feedback mechanism to catch it.  We ought 
to stop treating this problem primarily as one of bad apples, 
though there is room to weed out bad apples.  Instead, we should 
approach it more as a systemic design issue, to make sure that the 
internal guidelines guard against similar mistakes the next time a 
supervisor has to review and approve this particular kind of plea.   
Bar committees and the National Association of Criminal De-
fense Lawyers can play constructive roles here as well.  Those or-
ganizations can develop standards of care in the same way that 
insurers in managed medical care developed standards of care.  At 
this symposium, Professor Ronald Wright talked about numerical 
standards here that might give one a rough guideline for what 
kinds of representation prove effective, based on empirical evi-
dence.9  Defender organizations can develop manuals and training 
materials.  In the medical field, Dr. Atul Gawande has developed 
an argument for using checklists.10  Each doctor, of course, thinks 
that his own clinical judgment is superior and that he has an intu-
itive feel for what care is right.  But, actuarially, professional doc-
tors do make mistakes when they do not follow protocols.  Similar-
ly in the legal field, a simple checklist can help avoid common mis-
takes.   
Software can also help.  There is now an iPhone app called 
CrimQuick that a criminal litigator can take into Pennsylvania 
state court and use to look up the statutory crime, its gravity 
score, its statutory class, and its statutory maximum penalty.  The 
user can cross-reference it with a client’s criminal-history score 
and the state sentencing guidelines to derive a guidelines sentenc-
ing range along with the amount of variance allowed for aggrava-
tion and mitigation.  The app will not convey everything about the 
situation, but it will send up red flags in clear cases and yellow 
flags in unclear cases.  Similar tools could, for example, ensure 
that lawyers advert to whether their clients are citizens and, if 
they are not, could flag whether the charge of conviction is an ag-
gravated felony triggering mandatory deportation.  In this man-
ner, software could catch some errors, and technology could ad-
dress much of the routine and most predictable collateral conse-
  
 9. Ronald Wright, Professor at Wake Forest School of Law, Comparatively Evaluating 
Defense Counsel, Presentation at the Duquesne University School of Law Plea Bargaining 
After Lafler and Frye Symposium (Mar. 1, 2013). 
 10. ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO:  HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT (2010). 
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quences of guilty pleas.  Those tools could ensure that defense 
lawyers explain collateral consequences to their clients.   
Legal second opinions could extend beyond lawyers to include 
federal probation officers, who compute presentence investigation 
reports.  Probation officers must calculate likely sentences and 
could also summarize the elements required for proof.  Judges 
could even delay acceptance of pleas, at least in the major cases, 
so that probation officers would first prepare presentence reports 
in time for pleas.  Granted, that is impractical in a high-volume 
misdemeanor court, but for the most serious crimes one could at 
least benefit from this modest formal investigation before the plea. 
Sentencing judges could contribute significantly as well.  As I 
said, at least in the most serious cases, judges can delay ac-
ceptance of the plea until ready to combine it with sentencing, es-
pecially if there is going to be a presentence investigation.  (That 
will not always be possible, of course, in high-volume courts.)  At 
the plea hearing, the judge or the prosecutor could place the plea 
offer terms on the record.  And, in that fraction of cases where the 
defendant is barreling towards trial and has turned down the 
plea, the judge could hold a pre-trial conference.11  There are some 
judges who are already starting to put the plea offer, its terms, 
and the defendant’s awareness of the offer on the record, so that 
defendants cannot later claim regret over their decisions and 
manufacture belated challenges to their pleas.  I do not think in 
practice many defendants succeed in challenging their pleas, but 
such a process could guard against that danger.   
Also, like Professor Alschuler, I favor loosening the rule that, in 
most jurisdictions, bans judges from participating in plea negotia-
tions.12  It is misguided.  In a world where prosecutors hold all the 
cards, the judge is a real potential check on the power of the pros-
ecutor.  And in a world in which the defense counsel bears the 
heavy responsibility of performing effectively, the judge again can 
be a backstop in making sure that the defendant has heard what 
the terms are and at least a neutral prediction of the likely out-
comes.  One could add a further safeguard: a particular defendant 
would remain free to disregard the judge’s advice and have his 
case reassigned to a different judge for trial.  I think that would 
  
 11. See Bibas, supra note 5, at 2542-43. 
 12. Albert W. Alschuler, The Trial Judge’s Role in Plea Bargaining, Part I, 76 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1059, 1123-34 (1976); see, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1). 
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also drive the overoptimistic defendant towards taking neutral 
advice.   
Judges could possibly be prompted by the advisory rules com-
mittees to create a record at plea colloquies or pretrial hearings.  
They could ask defendants whether they had discussed proposed 
pleas with their lawyers and whether the lawyer had followed a 
checklist and advised him about the applicable sentencing guide-
lines.  Particularly if the parties put the terms of their agreement, 
indeed the entire plea agreement, in writing, the judge could en-
sure that the colloquy was meaningful, the terms were on the rec-
ord, and the parties could not later dispute what was said or what 
was conveyed. 
We could dream about a fundamentally different system, such 
as an inquisitorial system.  In that scenario, a judge would have a 
more active role, but that would probably be a bridge too far in 
America given our adversarial tradition embodied in the Bill of 
Rights.  That might be a shame, especially for misdemeanor cases 
that otherwise receive very little in the way of procedural safe-
guards.  But a full-blown inquisitorial system is probably imprac-
tical in America, at least for criminal cases. 
Sentencing commissions could also assist a great deal.  Such 
commissions could provide statistical summaries, tabulating the 
percentages of cases that result in convictions and the distribution 
of expected sentences after conviction.  Some judges, such as 
Judge Michael Marcus in Multnomah County, Oregon, have de-
veloped software systems to display the range of similar charges 
that have been brought, the results at trial, the convictions, and 
the expected sentences post-trial and post-plea.13  And one could 
generate vignettes of what the median case looks like, so that a 
defendant could compare his case to the typical case.  Sentencing 
commissions could assist in developing the evidence, graphics, 
visuals, and lay explanations, so that even a relatively uneducated 
defendant could understand very simply that, for example, a trial 
probably means seven to ten years in jail afterwards with an 85% 
probability and that a plea results in four or five years of incarcer-
ation.  Some defendants will remain overly optimistic or be risk-
seeking gamblers, regardless of what lawyers and courts do to ed-
ucate them.  But one can at least reduce the risk and the danger 
  
 13. See, e.g., Michael Marcus, Sentencing for Public Safety and Harm Reduction, SMART 
SENTENCING, http://smartsentencing.com/whatwrks.html (last updated Jan. 22, 2011). 
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that a defendant’s misunderstanding will exacerbate those prob-
lems. 
There is much that prosecutors can do, particularly in the Lafler 
and Frye scenario where the prosecutor wants to negotiate, the 
defense lawyer wants to negotiate, and everyone wants to negoti-
ate, and the danger is really that a misunderstanding or miscom-
munication is impeding the negotiation.  It is more difficult to ad-
dress in the reverse scenario where perhaps the defendant’s inter-
ests are served by not taking the deal.  But in the Lafler and Frye 
scenarios, one can have reverse proffers, in which the prosecutor 
sits down with the defendant and says we have these pieces of ev-
idence, and if the jury sees this material in my experience with a 
couple of eye witnesses and with this physical evidence, you will 
be convicted and here is the sentencing guidelines range.  It is bi-
zarre, but in my experience clients distrust their appointed de-
fense lawyers (because, in their mind, a free lawyer must be worth 
what they paid for him) and trust prosecutors more.  Sometimes, 
hearing the plain truth from the prosecutor can leave more of a 
lasting impression on a defendant.14 
I also think there is room within the prosecutor’s office to create 
a process for a second opinion or an internal appeal to supervisors, 
as Judge Jerry Lynch has suggested.15  But that is not going to 
work in run-of-the-mill, low-level misdemeanor cases.  The Second 
Circuit recognized in the Pimentel case that if the defendant has a 
plea bargain, the defendant at least has some ability to predict the 
sentence.  When the defendant does not have a plea bargain but 
enters an open or blind plea, however, it is a good practice for 
prosecutors to send a so-called Pimentel letter to lay out an under-
standing of how the sentencing guidelines would apply to the de-
fendant’s case.16  If a Pimentel letter details the likely range of 
sentences and collateral consequences, then there is less room for 
the defendant to misunderstand the applicable sentencing guide-
lines.  That approach at least provokes conversation between the 
defendant and the defense lawyer as to why the defendant would 
expect to improve upon the prosecutor’s prediction by pleading 
  
 14. See Bibas, supra note 5, at 2525. 
 15. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 2117, 2147-49 (1998). 
 16. United States v. Pimentel, 932 F.2d 1029, 1034 (2d Cir. 1991) (“invit[ing] Govern-
ment attorneys to play a similar role [in explaining the likely Guidelines sentence to de-
fendants before acceptance of their pleas] in helping to ensure that guilty pleas indeed 
represent intelligent choices by defendants”). 
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guilty without a plea agreement.  Such an approach also makes it 
difficult to claim later that the applicable sentencing guidelines 
were never even part of negotiations or not a subject of discus-
sion.17 
Prosecutors’ offices should also require prosecutors to make 
pleas offers in writing, in plain English, giving copies to the de-
fendant directly, and putting them into a simple, easily under-
standable form.  If they took such steps, it would be more difficult 
for defendants to claim later that they never received notice.18 
My final point is that the legal profession can learn from the 
way that health care law monitors informed consent.  The legal 
system must rely upon attorneys’ expert judgment.  Health care 
law has a series of backstops, aids, and information that helps 
communicate the risks involved in various medical procedures and 
courses of treatment to the patient.  A similar procedure would 
also effectively contribute to the fairness of plea bargaining.  In-
formed consent will not solve the problems highlighted by the crit-
ics of plea bargaining, and it will not eliminate the imbalance of 
power inherent in the system.  It would, however, expose the most 
egregious misunderstandings.  It would further guard against 
manufactured claims, by establishing a record up front and fore-
stalling any gross misunderstandings. 
 
  
 17. Stephanos Bibas, Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to 
Consumer Protection, 99 CAL. L. REV. 1117, 1156-57 (2011). 
 18. Id. at 1154-55. 
